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When a time-sensitive target (TST) is identified in an active military area of 
operations, planners must quickly revise current air tasking orders (ATOs) to re-task 
available air missions and strike this new, high-priority target immediately.  This re-
tasking must take into account the current coverage of known targets, risks of attrition, 
probabilities of successful prosecution, and the time window over which the TST is 
vulnerable.  In the current decision cycle for time-sensitive targeting, re-tasking must be 
accomplished in less than three minutes.   
Airpower was recently used to neutralize a significant terrorist threat and enemy 
in the Iraqi area of operations, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  In this well-publicized example, 
we saw ground forces find, fix and track a textbook TST.  The offensive operations cell 
in the Air Operations Center (AOC) at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, targeted this TST with 
two F-16s carrying precision-guided munitions, but they did so without an analytical 
decision aid.  The Zarqawi attack may be viewed as a success for the current TST 
targeting process, but the same conflict contains examples of failures, too. 
Furthermore, a success may only be partial if re-tasking takes strike assets away 
from other targets, these assets cannot be replaced, and other high-priority targets cannot 
be hit.  Could the AOC have “juggled” its assets more effectively?  Clearly, revising an 
ATO effectively, in the context of TSTs, is a complicated, highly constrained, 
optimization problem that must be solved very quickly. 
This thesis develops an automated, optimizing decision aid, the Rapid Asset 
Pairing Tool-Operations Research (RAPT-OR), for the purpose of quickly revising an 
ATO to account for one or more TSTs.  It consists of an integer-programming 
formulation of the ATO revision process, a link to a commercial solver that provides an 
optimal revision to a given ATO, and a heuristic algorithm that produces near-optimal 
revisions very quickly.  RAPT-OR also has a spreadsheet interface that presents all 
relevant data in a format that is easy for operators to understand and modify.  Results are 
reported directly in the spreadsheet and highlight the changes to the current ATO, the 
probability of successful prosecution of each TST, the probability of attrition of each 
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mission assigned to a TST, and other data to help inform a planner’s ultimate decision.  
RAPT-OR can provide several near-optimal courses of action in seconds, and contains 
planner-controlled parameters to define (a) target priority, (b) the importance of risk 
aversion, (c) strike-package size limits, and (d) other factors that influence the final 
revision.  The planner may adjust these factors, re-solve the model several times, and 
produce several alternative courses of action in the three-minute re-tasking window. 
In a test scenario with two simultaneous TSTs, over 20 ATO missions and 10 
incumbent targets, the RAPT-OR heuristic finds a near-optimal solution almost instantly, 
and, using commercial optimization software, finds the top four re-tasking solutions in a 
matter of seconds.  Each of the resulting plans successfully prosecutes two new TSTs, 
requires few changes to the current ATO, combines strike platforms with electronic 
warfare platforms to keep all attrition probabilities extremely low, and keeps all prior 
targets sufficiently covered. 
RAPT-OR is easy to use, and can provide valuable analytical support for revising 
an ATO in a time-constrained setting.  It could even be used to help generate the original 
ATO.  The heuristic algorithm provides near-optimal solutions almost instantly, and is 
available to any user of Microsoft Excel.  (Of course, RAPT-OR should be interfaced 
with common operating picture (COP) software for best results.)  RAPT-OR could also 
be extended to help coordinate an entire joint fire support environment.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND OVERVIEW 
When new high-priority targets arise in an active military area of operations, 
planners must revise current air tasking orders quickly to strike these targets.  Frequently 
these are “Time Sensitive Targets” (TSTs) that present a short time window of 
vulnerability.  A study of Air Operations Centers (AOCs), the organizations that perform 
this planning, shows a requirement for a decision aid to help revise incumbent plans 
when such time sensitive targets appear [Jumper 2004].  This thesis develops an 
automated, optimizing decision aid, the Rapid Asset Pairing Tool-Operations Research 
(RAPT-OR), for this purpose.   
RAPT-OR comprises a set-packing optimization model and model generator, a 
heuristic solver, an optional exact solver, a database and a graphical user interface (GUI).  
The model generator strips target assignments from the missions defined by the current 
Air Tasking Order (ATO), and combines these “targetless missions” in various ways with 
various targets to form a large set of potential strike packages.  (Some of these will be 
identical to those strike packages implicitly defined in the current ATO.) The model then 
assigns a “reward” to each strike package that accounts for target value while penalizing 
for risk of attrition, distance traveled, changes incurred over the current ATO and other 
factors.  The RAPT-OR heuristic solver (or the optional exact solver) then selects a 
subset of the potential strike packages that tries to (a) strike all pre-existing and new 
targets, (b) minimize disturbances to the original ATO, (c) satisfy minimum desired kill 
probabilities, and (d) avoid attrition of the tasked friendly assets. 
By solving the optimization model heuristically, rather than with commercial 
mathematical-programming software, RAPT-OR can be rapidly distributed and reliably 
operated without the expense of licenses and special training. This is crucial in an 
expeditionary, military environment.  However, we verify that the heuristic works well 
by comparing heuristically obtained solutions with provably optimal ones. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
1. Problem Statement 
The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are filled with examples of TSTs, 
i.e., targets of critical importance with fleeting opportunities for striking.  One need only 
look at the well-publicized lost opportunities to strike enemy leadership targets in both 
countries to see the importance of managing the process of “time-sensitive targeting” (for 
example, attempts to destroy Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri [Lambeth 2005]). 
At its roots, the problem of managing time-sensitive targeting is one of managing 
many short decision cycles [Lambeth 2005].  In order to “kill” a TST as it moves across 
the battle space, the attacking side must form and execute its strike plan quickly.  
Planners must assign available strike assets to the new target, and if those assets are taken 
away from existing targets, the planners must reassign the now-uncovered targets to other 
assets, if at all possible.  Furthermore, planners must try to ensure that the reassignments 
meet kill-probability goals, do not pose undue risks of attrition to the attacking aircraft, 
and keep plan turbulence to a minimum; by “plan turbulence,” we mean wholesale 
changes to the current plan that would require excessive amounts communication and 
coordination, and would introduce many chances for mistakes.  In an environment that 
might involve scores of targets and hundreds of aircraft, it is clearly impossible for a 
time-constrained human planner to revise an ATO optimally or near-optimally to respond 
to a TST. 
But time is highly constrained because the TST may quickly disappear, and 
because the available pool of assignable aircraft includes (a) some that are, at that 
moment, flying toward previously assigned targets, (b) some that may be about to launch 
from the ground or aircraft carrier toward previously assigned targets, and (c) some that 
are loitering in the air, consuming limited fuel, waiting to be assigned to a target.  
Clearly, a fast, automated decision aid is needed for this ATO re-planning process.   
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2.  The Air Tasking Order (ATO), Strike Packages, Missions and Targets 
 A number of the terms associated with air tasking mean different things to 
different organizations throughout the U.S. military.   For the sake of clarity, this thesis 
applies the following standardized definitions:   
• Target:  “A target is an area, complex, installation, force, equipment, 
capability, functions, or behavior identified for possible action to support 
the commander’s objectives, guidance and intent.” [JP 1-02] 
• TST:  “[A target] of such high priority to friendly forces the Joint Force 
Commander designates it as requiring immediate response because it 
poses (or soon will pose) danger to friendly forces, or it is a highly 
lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity.” [JP 1-02] 
• ATO (Air Tasking Order):  The published plan for a specific military 
theater that encompasses all elements of the air operation: mission 
scheduling, airspace, air defense, in-flight refueling plan, communication 
plan, electronic warfare, search and rescue, suppression of enemy air 
defense, special instructions and rules of engagement. 
• Mission:  A single assignment of one or more like aircraft in an ATO.  
Missions dealing with “strike” or attack of surface target are of primary 
concern to this thesis.  As in Weaver [2003], we assume that the need for 
quick re-planning means that a mission can not be divided into its sub-
elements of individual aircraft.  All missions are assumed to be associated 
with a specific target at time of launch.  If a mission is launched to loiter, 
and be tasked airborne, it is given an artificial, place-holder target.  
• Strike Package:  A combination of missions (of possibly like or unlike 
aircraft types) that is designed for the destruction of ground targets or the 
suppression of enemy air defense.  Each strike package is associated with 
a target, or target-threat combination. 
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• Threat:   An enemy surface-to-air missile system or fighter aircraft 
protecting a target.  Threats can be targets.  Threats have an associated 
potential to attrite friendly aircraft. 
The ATO is the document that prescribes (and schedules) all missions for manned 
aircraft, whereas the Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) covers both manned and unmanned 
aircraft. The methods developed in this thesis apply to both ATOs and ITOs, but, for 
simplicity, we will refer to the ATO only.  Chapter II presents a detailed discussion of the 
process by which the ATO is created, and the organizations involved in its creation.  
  Our definition of “target” above correctly implies that planning a strike on a 
target is normally a deliberate process that can take hours and even days.  In contrast, a 
TST must be handled “on the fly.”  Planners do account for the fact that TSTs will arise, 
and will need to be addressed, however. 
Planners use certain missions as placeholders for potential TST attacks.  For 
instance, “XCAS” is an ATO identifier specifying on-call, airborne close air support.  
The XCAS aircraft are fueled and armed, and loiter in a specific area until they are 
assigned to a target.  However, the majority of ATO missions are preplanned against 
known targets with identified locations, and only a few or no unassigned aircraft may be 
available when a TST is identified.   Thus, revising the ATO to strike a TST while 
maintaining coverage of previously assigned targets is a complicated, highly constrained 
optimization problem.  This problem must be also solved quickly to provide an answer in 
the short time window available. 
 
3. Revising an ATO   
The factors that guide a good revision to an existing ATO are the same ones that 
guide the original generation.  When determining the “best capable” attack platform(s), 
the JFC normally incorporates the six factors below in an assessment:   
(1) Effectiveness.  Depending on the desired effects, the appropriate weapons 
and/or capabilities should be selected.  For example, a specific type of attack 
asset such as a cruise missile may be highly effective in destroying an 
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unhardened TST, while destruction of a hardened TST might require an 
aircraft-delivered, precision-guided bomb. 
(2) Weapon and/or Capability Responsiveness.  Once a TST is detected, 
responsiveness is critical to ensure that the attack opportunity is not lost.  
Responsiveness can be measured as the elapsed time required from receipt of 
an execution order to weapons impact or effects.  (By default then, 
responsiveness is also concerned with whether or not the chosen weapon 
system and/or capability can operate given current environmental conditions.) 
(3) Range.  The weapon system that is selected to strike the TST must be able to 
reach the target without running out of fuel.  In the case of a manned system, 
it must also be able to return. 
(4) Accuracy.  The weapons system designated for an attack should be able to 
attack the target accurately.  For example, the circular error for unguided 
weapons might be insufficient to ensure a high probability of kill on a mobile 
target and thus, precision-guided weapons would be required. 
 (5) Threat.  A TST may be located in a heavily-defended area.  For instance, the 
existence of a significant air-defense threat may preclude the use of non-
stealth aircraft.  If air-delivered munitions must be employed against such 
heavily defended TSTs, assets that can suppress enemy air defense, or 
electronic attack capabilities, may be required.  
(6) Deconfliction.  This is critical to prevent fratricide, mishaps and unnecessary 
expenditure of aircraft or other assets.  For instance, the flight path of a 
missile must not conflict, in time and space, with friendly aircraft transiting an 
area [505th TRS, FUN-234 2002]. 
 
RAPT-OR specifically deals with all of the above factors except deconfliction 
when providing decision-support for an ATO revision.  
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C.   HISTORY OF ATO AUTOMATION 
RAPT-OR’s history dates back to 2001 when the Space and Naval Warfare 
Command (SPAWAR) started work on a decision aid to help reassign aircraft when TSTs 
were discovered during the execution of an ATO.  Although SPAWAR was developing 
its own decision aid, it commissioned Dr. Richard Rosenthal at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) to provide a backup.  The SPAWAR effort yielded a tool known as the 
Rapid Asset Pairing Tool (RAPT) [McDonnell et al. 2002].  RAPT uses a genetic 
algorithm (heuristic), and was received with encouragement.  However, it still awaits 
testing to determine whether or not it delivers tactically useful results.  Rosenthal, and 
Major Davi Castro, Brazilian Air Force, developed an integer-programming model for 
this purpose [Castro 2003].  After this model was developed, Major Paul Weaver, 
USMC, continued the work at NPS [Weaver 2004] with enhancements and an operational 
test of Rosenthal and Castro’s “static optimization model” (along with a longer-range 
“dynamic model”).  We shall refer to this last model as the “RCW model” hereafter. 
The RCW model was tested at the Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics 
Instructor’s (WTI) course.  Although WTI has limited scope—specifically, it does not 
maintain a significant pool of unassigned aircraft at any time—the RCW model proved 
reasonably fast, and quite accurate and valuable [Weaver 2004].  The drawbacks to the 
RCW model, as it stood in 2004, were (a) the requirement for difficult-to-use 
optimization software and attendant licenses, and (b) “reasonably fast” might not be fast 
enough when dealing with a real ATO scenario. Chapter II will show that RAPT-OR 
must provide support for making a final decision in a three-minute window of the TST 
targeting process.  This means that it must solve in seconds.    
Our primary goal is to produce an immediately usable decision aid for ATO 
planners.  In addition to the issues described above, one of the reasons that the RCW 
model has not yet been adopted for actual use is that prior research did not identify the 
ultimate end-users of the model.  Consequently, the RCW model does not address all of 
the problems faced in rapid ATO planning.  This thesis identifies the potential users of 
RAPT-OR, and provides a detailed study of where time-sensitive targeting occurs. We 
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provide some background on potential users and the process by which an ATO is 
formulated and executed, and the specific challenges with regard to TSTs.  To 
accomplish this, we have visited two separate AOCs as well as the facility that is 
responsible for training AOC personnel (505th Training Squadron, Hurlburt Field, 
Florida).  In addition, we have observed six separate TST exercises to elicit input from 
potential operators of RAPT-OR.   
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
Opportunities to test decision aids such as RAPT-OR are limited.  A realistic 
operational test would have to take place in an AOC.   
 As mentioned above, RAPT-OR does not capture concerns for deconfliction.  
While deconfliction is an important consideration, we feel that this is primarily an air-
space coordination problem and not within the scope of this thesis or RAPT-OR.  On the 
other hand, RAPT-OR produces solutions so quickly, it should be possible to use it 
iteratively until an ATO revision is found that satisfies deconfliction requirements. 
Certain AOC personnel have requested the ability to incorporate collateral 
damage estimates (CDEs) into the re-planning process.  It is certainly possible to 
calculate a CDE for any strike package, and penalize each package as an increasing 
function of this value.  However, these calculations would require collection of vast 
amount of data to which we do not have access: incorporating CDEs within RAPT-OR is 
a field for future research.   
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II provides a more thorough discussion of the AOC and time-sensitive 
targeting, as well as the billet(s) that would benefit most from the use of RAPT-OR.  
Chapter III describes the RAPT-OR optimization model as well as the heuristic used to 
solve it approximately.  Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis and comparison of the 
RCW model and exact and heuristic solutions to the RAPT-OR model.  Chapter V is 
devoted to conclusions and recommendations.  
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Appendix A describes modification to the RAPT-OR optimization model that will 
produce multiple courses of action.   By implementing this embellishment, a decision 
maker could choose from a list of reformulated ATOs in descending order of quality and 











II. TIME SENSITIVE TARGETING IN THE AIR OPERATIONS 
CENTER (AOC)  
A. INTRODUCTION  
An AOC is “A jointly-staffed facility established for planning, directing, and 
executing joint air operations in support of the joint force commander’s operation or 
campaign objectives….”(JP 1-02 DOD Dictionary).  This chapter describes the AOC, 
which is the organization responsible for the planning, production, dissemination and 
execution of an ATO.  The AOC is also responsible for revising the ATO to prosecute 
TSTs.  With a thorough understanding of the structure of an AOC and the complexity of 
the ATO process, the reader can understand the challenges associated with rapidly 
revising the ATO to accommodate TSTs. We will describe the compressed time cycle in 
which the reformulation of the ATO must occur, which clearly identifies the need for an 
automated decision aid.  
We note that the reader who is familiar with the operations of an AOC may wish 
to proceed directly to section C for a description of the ATO production process. 
 
B. ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AOC 
Decision-making authority is central to the process of time sensitive targeting.  
The AOC is commanded by the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC).  The 
JFACC is designated by the JFC as the senior commander with the preponderance of air 
assets and the capability for command and control of these assets.  The JFACC derives 
authority from the JFC [JP 3-30].  The JFACC advises the JFC on how he can best 
support the joint force with air and space assets.  This advice includes the 
recommendation of targets to be classified as TSTs, and thus requiring a revision of the 
current ATO. 
The AOC provides command and control (C2) for the theater joint aviation assets; 
however, some aviation assets may remain under the tasking authority of component 
commanders other than the JFACC.  As the commander for all joint forces in a given 
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theater, the JFC alone has authority for redirection of aviation assets.  To enable a rapid 
targeting cycle for TSTs, the JFC often delegates TST engagement authority to the 
JFACC.  Thus, the AOC becomes the central C2 agency for time sensitive targeting. 
An AOC exists wherever there is a standing or potential joint force, for example: 
Republic of Korea (Korean Peninsula), Italy (Balkans), and Qatar (Iraq and Afghanistan).  
An AOC staff is comprised of all services and several national agencies.  To execute 
theater-level C2 during 24-hour operations with subject-matter experts from many areas 
(e.g., pilots, targeteers, lawyers), each AOC is manned by hundreds of personnel.    
(Unfortunately, large, diverse staffs often hinder quick decision-making.) 
To refine the process of guidance, production, execution and analysis of results 
for the ATO, the AOC is divided into five divisions: strategy, combat operations, combat 
plans, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) and air mobility.  Each division has 
important functions that the reader should understand, because these create an 
appreciation for the level of planning and consideration that goes into formulating an 
ATO and the difficulty of time-sensitive targeting.  These functions also show how the 
various divisions will have influence on or will be influenced by RAPT-OR, should 
RAPT-OR be adopted. 
The strategy division formulates the Air Operations Directive (AOD) to ensure 
that the ATO is consistent with guidance from the JFACC, including guidance on TSTs.  
This division also employs an operations-research cell to carry out a post-execution 
assessment of each day’s ATO.  This cell reports to the strategy division leader on how 
given strategies are working with respect to overall campaign objectives.  Strategy is also 
responsible for taking JFC’s guidance with respect to the prosecution of TSTs and 
ensuring that it is translated into the ATO.  Because of this, the strategy division would 
provide target values and other parameters required by the RAPT-OR model.  
The combat plans division performs many tasks.  Among combat plans’ sub-
elements is the joint or combined guidance, apportionment and targeting team (GAT or 
JGAT), and the master air attack planning (MAAP) cell. The job of the GAT is to 
produce the daily Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List (JIPTL).  Once the JIPTL is 
approved by the JFACC, it then goes to the MAAP cell to have air assets assigned to 
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targets.  The MAAP assigns available weapons-delivery platforms to targets.  During the 
MAAP and GAT portions of the ATO process, each target is assigned a priority and 
assets: these priorities would guide RAPT-OR in re-tasking existing targets.   
Combat operations is responsible for executing the ATO.  To accomplish this, 
combat operations contains both offensive and defensive operations teams consisting of 
military aviators.  It is the offensive operations team that prosecutes TSTs and may even 
include a special cell exclusively for this purpose.  We believe that the appropriate user of 
RAPT-OR, as the AOC is currently configured, resides in the offensive operations team.  
The offensive operations team would input the TSTs into RAPT-OR and specify the 
desired probabilities of kill, per the guidance of JFACC or JFC as supplied by the 
strategy division. 
The intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) division and air mobility 
division support the other planning and execution divisions within the AOC with the 
addition of critical intelligence and air movement (logistics) information.  ISR would 
provide the intelligence necessary to generate accurate probabilities of kill and attrition 
for use by RAPT-OR. 
Figure 1 summarizes this discussion of all the divisions, teams and cells within 
the AOC. 




































Figure 1. The Air Operations Center Organization, graphically.   
RAPT-OR is designed for use by individuals within the offensive operations team of 
combat operations, although organizations in italics would need to supply specific input. 
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C. THE ATO PRODUCTION PROCESS 
The production of the ATO is deliberative, and can only consider a target whose 
location is known.  However, contingency missions are included for targets, time-
sensitive or otherwise, that invariably appear during execution of the ATO.  For instance, 
multiple groups of two to four aircraft may be assigned to “on-call close air support.”  
See Figure 2 for an example of an ATO containing such a mission.  RAPT-OR assigns 
each contingency mission to a dummy target, and does not view a change in that 
assignment as adding turbulence to a revised ATO.   
ATO production begins 48 hours before the ATO is to be executed.  All five AOC 
divisions remain engaged continuously in either production or analysis.  Five ATOs are 
considered by the AOC at any one time.  The first ATO resides with the strategy division 
which develops the AOD; the second is in the guidance and apportionment process; the 
third is in master air attack development; the fourth ATO is being executed by combat 
operations; and the fifth is being assessed by the strategy division’s assessment team.  In 
the end, the ATO production must integrate all elements of the air operation: airspace, air 
defense, in-flight refueling plan, communication plan, electronic warfare, search and 
rescue, suppression of enemy air defense, special instructions and rules of engagement. 
The result of the above process is a static document, the ATO. Clearly this 
presents a problem for time-sensitive targeting.  Targets that appear outside of the ATO 
production process must be dealt with immediately and must therefore be handled as 






















Figure 2. A sample from an ATO.   
Starting at the first “TASKUNIT” we see that SHANK 71 is a flight of 2 AV-8Bs from 
the 2nd Marine Air Wing at Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC.  They are tasked 
with the mission of “XCAS” (airborne, on call, close air support) and should be on 
station with a load of MK-82 bombs.  SHANK 71’s aerial refueling information is 
located on the following lines, 4, 5 and 6 from the top. 
 
 
D. TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETING 
There are several challenges in time-sensitive targeting, the main one being that 
the timeline for targeting is now greatly compressed, yet all steps in the regular targeting 
process must still be accomplished.  The JFC must quickly select an asset to strike this 
emergent target based on the six factors discussed in Chapter I: effectiveness, 
responsiveness, range, accuracy, threat and deconfliction. 
TST targeting requires strike platforms that have the right mix of effectiveness, 
responsiveness, range and accuracy.  Aircraft often possess that mix, so they are the most 
commonly used platform for striking TSTs, either solely or as part of an integrated strike 
with ground forces.  Once the decision is made to task aircraft to strike a TST, command 
and control authority to enact that strike is passed from JFC to JFACC and the AOC. 
Regardless of the urgent nature of a TST, the AOC must complete the same 
planning cycle for assigning strike assets as is required during the normal ATO planning 
process. This compressed targeting process is known as “dynamic targeting” and must 
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satisfy six requirements, in rapid succession, in what is called the “kill chain”:  find, fix, 
track, target, engage and assess; see Figure 3. 
 
















t = 0                 2 5                        30 mins 
 
Figure 3. A diagram that indicates the amount of time allotted to each phase of 
the “Joint Kill Chain,” referred to as Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess 
(F2T2EA).   
This thesis focuses on the “Target” phase, seeking to render one or more courses of 
action within three minutes. 
 
 
Thirty minutes is the goal for dynamic targeting within the AOC, from “fix” (two 
minutes), to “target” (three minutes) to “engage” (25 minutes).  That is, only one-half 
hour should elapse from the time a TST is accurately located until weapons impact; see 
Figure 3.  This thesis focuses on the three-minute targeting step in this thirty-minute 
window.  A decision aid that could not generate a course of action, or several, in the 
allotted three minutes would not be useful.  As of this writing, RAPT-OR is the only 










III. OPTIMIZATION MODEL FOR THE RETASKING OF AIR 
STRIKE ASSETS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter formulates the TST target-assignment problem as a generalized set-
packing problem.  This integer linear program is called “RAPT-OR-IP.”  As background, 
we also discuss the models designed by Castro [2003] and Weaver [2004].   
The model generator for RAPT-OR-IP (a) strips target assignments from the 
missions defined by the current ATO, (b) enumerates collections of these “targetless 
missions,” and (c) combines those with targets to form a large set of potential strike 
packages.  The model then assigns a “reward” to each strike package that accounts for the 
target value along with penalties for distance traveled by the package’s aircraft, changes 
that package incurs over the current ATO, and other factors.  The solution selects a subset 
of the potential strike packages that satisfies logical requirements and optimizes the 
revised ATO’s overall reward.  This chapter provides the formulation of RAPT-OR-IP, 
and describes the fast heuristic that we have developed to solve this model 
approximately. 
 
B. AN INTEGER PROGRAM TO OPTIMIZE ATO REVISIONS  
The following integer linear program, RAPT-OR-IP, seeks the best achievable 
revision to an incumbent ATO.  After we present this simple-looking model, we develop 
the considerable detail required compute its objective-function coefficients and actually 




t T∈   target (includes “none”)  
m M∈  ATO mission; a flight of one or more identical aircraft (typically  
   with identical loadouts)  
ˆmˆ M∈  ATO mission with target identification stripped:  (“Mission” in 
quotes refers to a targetless mission.)  
p P∈  (potential) strike package, consisting of one or more missions  
tP P⊆  subset of strike packages designed to strike target t 
mˆ
P P⊆  subset of strike packages that include “mission” mˆ  
 
2. Given Data [units] 
preward  “reward” received if target strike package p  is selected (includes 
factors for target value, expected attrition, distance and mission-to-
target changes) [reward units] 
_ pm changes  number of mission-to-target changes that are incurred by selection 
of  strike package p [cardinality] 
changes  maximum number of mission changes between the incumbent 
ATO and any revised ATO [cardinality] 
 
3. Decision Variables  
pSTRIKE  equals 1 if package p is selected, and is 0 otherwise 
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The objective (0) expresses the total reward received by the revised ATO.  
Constraints (1) allow each target to be attacked by at most one strike package.  
Constraints (2) allow a mission to be used in at most one strike package.  Constraint (3) 
limits the number of mission-to-target changes between the incumbent ATO and the 
revised ATO; this constraint is optional, of course. 
6. Data Development 
Generating a realistic instance of RAPT-OR-IP depends on considerable 
exogenous data processing.  We present this now. 
 
a. Additional Indices 
 
a A∈   aircraft type (e.g., AV-8BB, F-15C)  
r R∈   threat type (e.g., SA6, SA10, or none)  
w W∈  weapon type (e.g., MK-83, GBU-16)  
ˆ( )a m   aircraft type of “mission” mˆ  
( )t p   package p’s target 
( )r t   air-to-surface threat type presented by target t 
ˆ ˆ
pM M⊆  subset of “missions” included in strike plan p 
ˆ ˆ( )t m   incumbent target for “mission” mˆ  
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b. Input Data [units] 
 
maxMissions maximum number of “missions” considered for any candidate 
strike package 
_ tpk required commander’s minimum required probability of killing target t 
mˆnumac  number of aircraft in “mission” mˆ  
ˆ ,m wconfig  number of type w weapons carried by each aircraft in “mission” 
mˆ , called “loadout” or “standard conventional load” [weapons] 
,w rssp_suppress  single-shot probability that weapon w will suppress threat r  
,
_
r assp survive  single-shot probability that aircraft a will survive threat r  
(we assume a threat will shoot once at each attacking aircraft in a 
mission) 
,
_ w tssp kill  single-shot probability that a weapon w will kill target t 
tpriority  commander’s priority for target t; highest = 1 
pri_exponent  shape parameter in target priority valuation 
_priority wgt  weight assigned to target-priority in objective 
_attrition wgt  weight assigned to attrition of friendly aircraft in objective 
mˆ,tdistance  distance in nautical miles from current position of “mission” mˆ  
and target t  
_distance wgt  distance-penalty weighting factor in objective function 
_change wgt  mission-change-penalty weighting factor in objective function 
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7. Exogenous Computation 
This section describes how we compute the objective-function 
coefficients, preward , for RAPT-OR-IP.   Both Castro [2003] and Weaver [2004] use 
similar definitions and calculations, although their models and final objective-function 
coefficients are somewhat different. 
Each “mission” in the set of available “missions” ˆM  is defined by the state of its 
constituent aircraft at the time of revision planning, but the planner can screen out 
missions that should not be revised.  An “admissible package” meets certain criteria set 
by the decision maker with respect to acceptable probability of kill, package size and 
penalties.  The planner has several controls to define admissibility, and therefore limit the 
enumeration of packages.  (In its current implementation, RAPT-OR only limits 
admissibility through “maxMissions,” but other admissibility tests are trivial to 
implement.) 
Strike packages are generated by enumerating each admissible combination of no 
more than maxMissions  “missions.”  This is an important filter, because 
| || | MP
maxMissions
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  is possible. 
The following computations are carried out for each potential strike package p.  
However, the final set of admissible packages P  includes only those potential packages 
that satisfy admissibility criteria.  Note that each strike package p has target ( )t p , so 
even though a target index may not appear in every expression indexed by p, it is defined. 
 
ˆ |ˆ













m m wp w
pm M
numweps numac config w W
∈
= ∀ ∈∑ ; 
ˆ ,
















= − −∏ ; 
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(1 ) (1 _ )p p pp_attrit = p_suppress p survive− × − ; 








p survive ssp survive
∈













p kill ssp kill
∈
∈
= − −∏ ; and 
_ (1 _ ) _p p pp success p attrit p kill= − × . 
 
A strike package p is currently admissible in RAPT-OR if _ 0pp success >  .  
A stronger criterion on probability of success could be used, e.g., 
( )_ 0.5 _p t pp success pk required≥ × .  This would reduce the number of admissible 
packages and thereby simplify the following computations.  Other admissibility 
screens based on pp_attrit or other values are also possible. 
 




min _ , _
_ ;
p p t p
pri_exponent
t p





  _ _ _p ppen attrit attrit wgt p attrit= × ; 
  
ˆ ˆ ( )
ˆ
ˆ p
p m m,t p
m M
pen_distance distance_wgt numac distance
∈
= × ∑ ; and 
  _ _ _ pppen change change wgt m Change= × . 
 
Note that ptarget_value  is calculated such that the over-allocation of assets, 
or “overkill,” to a highly valued target does not result in an increase in 
ptarget_value . 
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Each objective-function coefficient preward  is a composite of target value 
and penalties: 
 
_p p p p preward = target_value pen_attrit pen_distance pen change− − − . 
 
We can solve the RAPT-OR IP with conventional, linear-programming based, 
integer-programming software, but we can also construct high-quality solutions very 
quickly with the purpose-built heuristic described next. 
.  
C. A FAST HEURISTIC SOLUTION METHOD 
This section describes an intuitively appealing greedy heuristic that finds a 
feasible solution to RAPT-OR-IP in polynomial time. 
1. Additional Indices 
OKp P P∈ ⊆   set of strike packages eligible for selection 
* *p P P∈ ⊆   set of strike packages selected 
 
Note that the solution *P = ∅ , i.e., 0STRIKE ≡  is feasible in RAPT-OR-IP.  We 
add strike packages to the set *P  while maintaining this feasibility. 
 
2. RAPT-OR-GH (RAPT-OR, Greedy Heuristic) 
 
Input:  Data for RAPT-OR-IP. 
Output:  A set of strike package *P  that satisfies the constraints of the RAPT-
OR IP and attempts to optimize that IP’s objective function. 
 
{ 
OKP P= ; *P = ∅ ; 
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/*The next statement selects the feasible package with the highest 
reward*/ 
 






= ;  
 
/* Reject *p  if adding it to partial ATO *P  would cause too many 
changes */ 
If the number of changes in ** { }P p∪  exceeds _m Changes { 
  
*\ { }OK OKP P p= ; 
  Go to Select; 
}  
 
/* Otherwise, *p  is added to the ATO */ 
** * { }P P p= ∪ ; 
 
/* If all targets are covered by the new ATO, the algorithm is finished */ 
 
If  *| |  = = | |P T  go to End; 
 
/* *p  covers a previously uncovered target.  Any remaining strike 
packages that  cover that target can be eliminated from further 
consideration */  
 
For (all *| ( ) ( )OKp P t p t p∈ == ) { }\{ };OK OKP P p=  
  
 If OKP == ∅  go to End; 
  
 Go to Select; 
 




RAPT-OR-GH has intuitive appeal and has proven effective in practice.  If future 
testing shows that it performs inadequately on some problems, sophisticated heuristics 
are available for this problem.  We refer the reader to Senju and Toyoda [1968] and 
Dobson [1982]; see also Brown et al. [1985] who apply the methods of those papers to 
generalized set-packing problems that resemble RAPT-OR-IP. 
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3. Graphical User Interface (GUI) and Improvements 
For his investigation of time-sensitive targeting, Weaver [2004] uses a graphical 
user interface (GUI) developed by Mr. Anton Rowe.  RAPT-OR uses an improved 
version of this GUI, developed by Rowe in consultation with the author [Rowe 2006].  
Through the GUI, the planner can accomplish these tasks: 
1. Input the current ATO and manually include or exclude missions as desired. 
2. Input TSTs, to include each target’s priority, location, type, defenses and 
desired probability of kill. 
3. Adjust model weights for priority, attrition and distance. 
4. Specify a maximum number of missions that can be assigned to a single 
package.  This parameter was added for this thesis work so that only packages 
of reasonable size would be generated.  
5.  (a) Select an exact solution to RAPT-OR-IP using GAMS optimization 
software, if available, or (b) use RAPT-OR-GH (heuristic solver) to obtain an 
approximate solution, or (c) do both, if possible.  
6. Set the maximum number of mission changes allowed to the incumbent ATO.  
 
4. Summary  
We have extended the models of Castro [2003] and Weaver [2004] for revising 
ATOs to respond to time-sensitive targets.   The new model, RAPT-OR-IP, prevents 
“overkill” of high-value targets at the risk of leaving other, lower priority targets un-
struck.  We have also developed a fast heuristic, RAPT-OR-GH, that produces high-
quality solutions to RAPT-OR-IP.  The size of the model is greatly reduced over its 
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IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
In order to validate RAPT-OR as a viable means of performing weapon-target 
pairing in real-time, we compare solutions produced by RAPT-OR-GH, RAPT-OR-IP 
and the legacy RCW model.  All computations are carried out on a 2.0 GHz Pentium 4 
Dell desktop computer at the Naval Postgraduate School.   
 
A. INITIAL TEST SCENARIO 
We perform initial tests on a simple scenario in which two TSTs must prosecuted 
during a time window in an ATO that involves six targets (SLA 15, SLA 30, TGT SA3, 
TGT 1, TGT 2 and TGT 3) and 11 missions; see Figure 4.  The two TSTs that “pop up” 
are “Terrorist Dhow” and “Osama.”  The former is undefended while the latter is 
defended by an SA-6, which must be neutralized by an electronic attack aircraft (e.g., an 
EA-6B); see Figure 5. 
 
Include Avail ao Mission ETD ETR Base # Aircraft Configuration Assignment Recommend
TRUE FALSE 6111 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 AV8B [2] CBU58 TGT SA3
TRUE FALSE 6113 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 F16 [4] MK83 TGT SA3
TRUE FALSE 6141 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 AV8B [2] CBU58 TGT 2
TRUE FALSE 6143 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 F16 [4] MK83 TGT 2
TRUE FALSE 6115 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 F16 [4] MK83 TGT 3
TRUE TRUE 6145 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 AV8B [4] MK83 SLA 15
TRUE TRUE 6147 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 AV8B [6] MK83 SLA 15
TRUE FALSE 6161 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 F15 [4] MK83 KB AA80
TRUE TRUE 6195 19:00 23:00 USS Roosevelt 2 F18C [4] CBU58 SLA 15
TRUE TRUE 6196 19:00 23:00 USS Roosevelt 2 F18C [4] CBU58 SLA 15
TRUE TRUE 6197 19:00 23:00 USS Roosevelt 2 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM TGT SA3
TRUE TRUE 6101 19:19 22:09 Al Kharj 2 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM TGT SA3
TRUE TRUE 6103 19:19 22:09 Al Kharj 1 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM TGT 2
TRUE TRUE 6104 19:19 22:09 Al Kharj 1 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM SLA 30
TRUE TRUE 6131 19:34 20:54 King Fahd 2 F15 [4] MK83 TGT 1
TRUE TRUE 6133 19:34 20:54 King Fahd 2 F15 [4] MK83 TGT 1
TRUE TRUE 6135 19:34 20:54 King Fahd 2 F15 [4] MK83 TGT 3
TRUE FALSE 6137 20:04 21:24 King Fahd 2 F18D [4] MK83 KB AA80
TRUE FALSE 6175 20:49 22:09 King Fahd 2 F18D [4] MK83 KB AA80
TRUE FALSE 6163 21:07 22:21 Riyadh 2 AV8B [4] MK82 SLA 15
TRUE FALSE 6165 21:22 22:36 Riyadh 2 AV8B [2] CBU58 SLA 15
19:45ATO
 
Figure 4.  A screen shot from RAPT-OR that displays missions available 
on the test ATO.   
The eleven shaded missions are those that are available for reassignment during the 
current time window and those that the planner allows to be reassigned.  (“Avail” 
indicates whether or not the mission could be reassigned, and “Include” indicates whether 
or not the planner wants to a allow reassignment.)  The column labeled “Assignment” 
shows the six targets currently assigned to those missions, viz., SLA 15, TGT SA3, TGT 














FALSE TGT SA3 2 32.70 40.00 SA3 SA3 95%
FALSE TGT A 4 32.52 45.00 Logistics Site 95%
FALSE TGT 2 8 35.73 43.83 Assembly Area 95%
FALSE TGT 3 9 31.20 43.64 Assembly Area 95%
FALSE ZSU 5 ZSU ZSU 75%
FALSE SA8 6 SA8 SA8 75%
FALSE FROG7 7 FROG7 75%
TRUE Osama 1 33.26 43.26 Troop in Open SA6 75%
TRUE Terrorist Dhow 3 30.58 46.87 Civilian Watercraft 95%
Target List
 
Figure 5.  The Time Sensitive Target List from RAPT-OR.  
This screen shot displays the current list of TSTs along with associated data.  The planner 
only wants to consider those TSTs having “TRUE” listed in the “Include” column, in this 
case, “Osama” and “Terrorist Dhow.”  This list will also report, in the last two columns, 
probability of success and attrition after revising the ATO. 
 
Values for damage, attrition, success, suppression and distance are calculated in 
exactly the same way for both RAPT-OR-IP and the RCW model.  This is not an 
endorsement of the independence assumption inherent in some of the calculations, but 
rather a standardized way of obtaining test results.  RAPT-OR could use any function to 
calculate these values, including the use of standard table look-ups. 
All penalties weights and factors are standardized between the two models; see 
Figure 6.  RAPT-OR’s parameter maxMissions, which specifies the maximum number of 
missions that a strike package may contain, is set to 5.  This value cannot be limited in 














Figure 6.  A screen shot of the parameters page in RAPT-OR.   
The first five values denote the parameters that are held in common between RAPT-OR 
and the RCW model in computational tests.  The last three values simply define the time 
window of interest (in both models).  Note that “Max Package” denotes RAPT-OR’s 
parameter maxMissions, which does not influence computations in the RCW model. 
 
 
B. INITIAL TEST RESULTS FOR RAPT-OR-GH 
Test results for RAPT-OR-GH are conclusive and interesting.  RAPT-OR-GH 
produces solutions for the test scenario in less than 2 seconds.  In contrast, the RCW 
model requires 205 seconds (3 minutes and 25 seconds).  This is important beyond the 
mere fact that RAPT-OR is faster: RAPT-OR’s speed would give the offensive 
operations cell the opportunity to generate several alternative courses of action within 
three minutes.  For instance, if the initial solution accepts too much risk, the attack 
coordinator can simply place a higher weight on the attrition penalty and rerun the model.  
The revised solution might eliminate some high-risk strikes entirely (because a high 
enough penalty might lead to the riskier packages having negative rewards), or the 
solution might accept lower success probabilities in order to reduce the chances for 
attrition. 
Figure 7 shows the modified ATO produced by RAPT-OR-GH, and Figure 8 
shows the corresponding results for the RCW model’s ATO revision. 
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Include Avail ao Mission ETD ETR Base # Aircraft Configuration Assignment Recommend
TRUE FALSE 6111 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 AV8B [2] CBU58 TGT SA3
TRUE FALSE 6113 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 F16 [4] MK83 TGT SA3
TRUE FALSE 6141 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 AV8B [2] CBU58 TGT 2
TRUE FALSE 6143 18:51 20:07 Riyadh 2 F16 [4] MK83 TGT 2
TRUE FALSE 6115 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 F16 [4] MK83 TGT 3
TRUE TRUE 6145 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 AV8B [4] MK83 SLA 15
TRUE TRUE 6147 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 AV8B [6] MK83 SLA 15
TRUE FALSE 6161 18:51 20:07 Al Ahsa 2 F15 [4] MK83 KB AA80
TRUE TRUE 6195 19:00 23:00 USS Roosevelt 2 F18C [4] CBU58 SLA 15 Terrorist Dhow
TRUE TRUE 6196 19:00 23:00 USS Roosevelt 2 F18C [4] CBU58 SLA 15
TRUE TRUE 6197 19:00 23:00 USS Roosevelt 2 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM TGT SA3 Osama
TRUE TRUE 6101 19:19 22:09 Al Kharj 2 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM TGT SA3
TRUE TRUE 6103 19:19 22:09 Al Kharj 1 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM TGT 2
TRUE TRUE 6104 19:19 22:09 Al Kharj 1 EA6B [1] POD [1] HARM SLA 30
TRUE TRUE 6131 19:34 20:54 King Fahd 2 F15 [4] MK83 TGT 1 Osama
TRUE TRUE 6133 19:34 20:54 King Fahd 2 F15 [4] MK83 TGT 1
TRUE TRUE 6135 19:34 20:54 King Fahd 2 F15 [4] MK83 TGT 3
TRUE FALSE 6137 20:04 21:24 King Fahd 2 F18D [4] MK83 KB AA80
TRUE FALSE 6175 20:49 22:09 King Fahd 2 F18D [4] MK83 KB AA80
TRUE FALSE 6163 21:07 22:21 Riyadh 2 AV8B [4] MK82 SLA 15
TRUE FALSE 6165 21:22 22:36 Riyadh 2 AV8B [2] CBU58 SLA 15
19:45ATO
 
Figure 7. The ATO annotated after recommendations are made in RAPT-OR. 
 










FALSE TGT SA3 2 32.70 40.00 SA3 SA3 95%
FALSE TGT 1 4 32.52 45.00 Logistics Site 95%
FALSE TGT 2 8 35.73 43.83 Assembly Area 95%
FALSE TGT 3 9 31.20 43.64 Assembly Area 95%
FALSE ZSU 5 ZSU ZSU 75%
FALSE SA8 6 SA8 SA8 75%
FALSE FROG7 7 FROG7 75%
TRUE Osama 1 33.26 43.26 Troop in Open SA6 75% 94.2% 0.1%
TRUE Terrorist Dhow 3 30.58 46.87 Civilian Watercraft 95% 99.9% 0.0%
Target List
 
Figure 8.  The RAPT-OR “Target List” page displaying a solution from the test 
scenario, produced by RAPT-OR-GH.  
The results here are analogous to those for RAPT-OR-GH.  showing that both targets 
have been covered with a 94.2% probability of success for “Osama” and 99.9% for 
“Terrorist Dhow.” 
 







FALSE TGT SA3 2 32.70 -112.62 SA3 SA3 95%
FALSE TGT 1 4 34.40 -112.08 Logistics Site 95%
TRUE Terrorist Dhow 3 32.00 -119.00 Civilian Watercraft 95% 98% 0%
FALSE TGT 3 8 32.18 -112.40 Assembly Area 95%
FALSE ZSU 5 ZSU ZSU 75%
FALSE SA8 6 SA8 SA8 75%
FALSE FROG7 7 FROG7 75%
TRUE Osama 1 32.34 -118.00 Troop in Open SA6 75% 100% 0%
Targets
 
Figure 9.  Results for the RCW model. 
This target list is analogous to the target list table for RAPT-OR.  There are differences in 
the location columns (Lat, Lon) because the scenario for the RCW test was set up in a 
different location in the world.  However, all relative locations and distances remain the 




As mentioned in Chapter III, we designed RAPT-OR to create packages with 
success probabilities close to the planner-mandated limit, but not  below it.  Because of 
this embedded logic, RAPT-OR sees no benefit in over-kill of the highest-priority targets.  
This explains the above results: while both models choose the same aircraft from the 
ATO, they assign them differently.  Both RAPT-OR and the RCW model send the same 
EA-6B to mitigate Osama’s SA-6, but RAPT-OR assigns an F-18 with smaller weapons 
to attack Osama because the pre-defined success criterion for Osama is only 75% 
probability of kill.  In contrast, the RCW model allots larger weapons to Osama due to his 
priority and the fact that higher probability of kill does yield a greater reward in that 
model.  In effect, the way that RAPT-OR calculates penalties and rewards embodies the 
military axiom of “economy of force” and husbands assets for other potential targets and 
those assigned on the ATO (Figure 7).  Through this mechanism RAPT-OR produces a 
solution that is closer to commander’s intent than the legacy model.  
 
C. COMPARING RAPT-OR-GH AND RAPT-OR-IP 
We believe that a majority of future RAPT-OR planners will be operating without 
the aid of commercial optimization software, so it is imperative to show that the greedy 
heuristic, RAPT-OR-GH, generates near-optimal solutions in real-time.  For this purpose, 
Table 1 compares heuristic and optimal solutions for six scenarios of varying sizes. 
In all cases except the last, GH finds the same solution as IP, i.e., in five of six 
cases, the heuristic finds the optimal solution.  In the one case that the optimal solution is 
slightly better than the heuristic one, the difference is only 0.02%.  Apparently, the 
heuristic obtains a solution that gives a better response time (smaller distance penalty) 
while sacrificing probability of success. 
Solution times for both GH and IP are short (a fraction of a second versus several 
seconds, respectively), and are not listed.  We believe that further testing on larger 
problems will show the computational-speed advantage of RAPT-OR-GH, but we must 
















GH Exact GH Exact GH Exact 
8 4 1   10.92   10.92 .974 .974 0.0 0.0 
8 4 2 110.14 110.14 .918 .918 0.1 0.1 
11 5 3 134.25 134.25 .893 .893 0.1 0.1 
14 6 4 140.17 140.17 .893 .893 0.1 0.1 
16 8 3 116.01 116.01 .918 .918 0.1 0.1 
20 9 4 140.58 140.61 .696 .747 0.1 0.1 
 
Table 1. Tests comparing heuristically generated and optimal solutions for 
RAPT-OR-IP. 
This table shows that RAPT-OR-GH’s heuristic solution (“GH” versus “Exact”) is 
optimal in five of six test scenarios.  In the last scenario, the heuristic solution is still 
within 0.02% of being optimal.  (Solution times are not listed because neither GH nor the 
exact solution require more than a few seconds to solve any of these problems.)  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis has described RAPT-OR (Rapid Asset Pairing Tool-Operations 
Research), an automated decision aid for weapon-target pairing in the case of a time-
sensitive target. RAPT-OR comprises a set-packing optimization model and generator, a 
heuristic solver, an optional exact solver, a database and a graphical user interface (GUI).  
We show that RAPT-OR is the only tool available for making near-optimal, real-time 
revisions to an Air Tasking Order to accommodate time-sensitive targets (TSTs).    
 
B. DIRECT OPERATIONAL APPLICATION 
During the writing of this thesis, airpower was used to neutralize a significant 
terrorist threat in the Iraqi area of operations, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.  In this example, 
we saw ground forces find, fix and track a textbook TST.  The offensive operations cell 
in the Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, then targeted this TST with two 
F-16s carrying precision-guided munitions, but they did so without the aid of an 
analytical decision aid.  The Zarqawi attack may be viewed as a success for the current 
time-sensitive targeting process, but the same conflict contains examples of failures, too.  
This thesis describes and demonstrates an automated decision aid that will reduce the 
number of future failures.  
 
B. OPERATIONAL INTRODUCTION 
RAPT-OR has been briefed to a number of different agencies and individuals.  
These include the U.S. Air Force Command and Control Innovation Task Force, the 
Navy Warfare Development Command, the Joint-Fires integrated project team at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, students and instructors of the United States Air Force’s 
505th Training Squadron (TRS), the Combined Air Operations Center: Osan, Korea and 
U.S. Navy Director of Assessments (N81).  Of particular note is the visit to the 505th 
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TRS, because this is where personnel for all U.S. AOCs are trained for follow-on 
assignment around the world.  Several of the student officers were going on to be attack 
coordinators in an active AOC and voiced interest in RAPT-OR for immediate use in 
operational theaters.  However, since RAPT-OR’s full contribution cannot be realized 
without DoD-wide acceptance and support, we introduced RAPT-OR to several 
standardization organizations for more complete acceptance and support before fielding.  
The members of all these organizations did have several insightful comments and 
suggestions for enhancing RAPT-OR. 
 
C. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
After introducing RAPT-OR to several potential customers within DoD, the 
suggestions listed below were made to make RAPT-OR more useful. 
 
1. Alternate Courses of Action 
This enhancement would automatically provide alternate ATO revisions that vary 
weights on risk, probability of kill, replanning turbulence and other factors, and provide 
alternate ATO revisions   This would be very easy to implement.  Currently, if the 
planner has the right commercial optimization software, he or she can already generate 
alternate courses of action that yield decreasing levels of “quality” for a fixed set of 
weights.  This could be used to quickly search for solutions that satisfy secondary criteria, 
regarding, for instance, deconfliction.   
 
2. Interface with the Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual (JMEM) 
JMEM is a classified document that includes, among other things, actual 
probabilities of kill given a specific delivery profile and delivery platform. By interfacing 
with JMEM, RAPT-OR would have correct, classified attrition and damage probabilities 
for all weapons and weapon systems.  In addition, this would eliminate the simple 
linearity and independence assumptions currently used in RAPT-OR’s calculations of 
probability of damage and attrition.  
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3. Interface with the Common Operating Picture (TBMCS or JBMC2) 
RAPT-OR should interface with current and future common operating picture 
(COP) software.  This would enable RAPT-OR to more accurate solutions, because 
aircraft position and available remaining weapons would be updated in real time.  The 
current system is known as Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) and its 
successor is in development: Joint Battle Management Command and Control (JBMC2) 
 
4. Expand RAPT-OR to all Fire Support Assets 
In chapter I of this thesis, examples are given of all the fire-support assets that the 
JFC has at his disposal when contemplating the prosecution of a TST; airpower is not 
alone.  We feel that with minimal effort RAPT-OR could be expanded to include all 
airborne, surface and sub-surface fire support assets in a theater, and give the JFC the 
best possible asset choice.  As the U.S. military continues its push towards a smaller, 
lighter and more distributed force, the command and control of this force must adapt to 
be able to cope with the increase in fire support requests from a much higher number of 
customers: RAPT-OR could give fire-support coordinators this capability.  It is in this 
effort that we feel RAPT-OR could make its greatest contribution.  As an example, the 
United States Marine Corps is now fielding the “distributed operations” concept, which 
involves the discretizing of larger units into many more small, highly-mobile units. 
However, the Marine Corps has not developed a way to source these small, dispersed 
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APPENDIX A 
Generating alternative courses of action via commercial optimization 
software. 
 










,k pstrike  1 if already-reported ATO revision k  includes package p , else 0 
 





























Each constraint (5) excludes respective strike plan k K∈ .  To use this feature, 
RAPT-OR-IP, with constraints (5), would be solved with K = ∅  to obtain *1, pstrike .  That 
solution would define {1}K = , RAPT-OR-IP would be solved with the new K for 
*
2, pstrike , {1,2}K =  would now be defined, and the process repeated.  This process could 
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